Daubert, Critique and Interpretation:
What Empirical Studies Tell Us About
the Application of Daubert
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LEGAL SCHOLARS

HAVE had a field day with the Supreme Court's
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.I This opinin
Daubert
1993 decision
ion, which changed the standard for the admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts and the judge's role in admissibility
determinations, 2 has inspired reams of literature and been subject to
a variety of criticisms. Most of these criticisms predict that Daubert
would result either in the excessive exclusion of evidence, or in arbitrary or inconsistent distinctions between what evidence is, and is not,
admissible. The majority of these criticisms address the context of
torts, particularly toxic torts, and this Article reflects this focus.
Until 2001, these criticisms of Daubert necessarily occurred only at
a theoretical level and at best with anecdotal evidence. Thankfully, in
the past few years, at least three comprehensive empirical studies have
shed light on how judges and parties to litigations are responding to
the decision.3 A fourth study by Professors Edward K. Cheng and Albert H. Yoon provides critical and surprising links between the data
developed in prior studies. 4 Taken together, these studies show that
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1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Id. at 597-98.
3. Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standardsfor Admitting Expert Evidence in
Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, RAND Institute for Civil Justice Report (2001)
[hereinafter RAND Study]; Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339
(2002) [hereinafter Groscup Study]; Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns RegardingExpert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'v &
L. 309 (2002) [hereinafter FJC Study].
4. Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REv. 471 (2005), [hereinafter Cheng & Yoon Study].
*

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

after Daubert, parties challenged the admissibility of evidence more
frequently, and judges scrutinized evidence more carefully, excluding
a greater proportion of it.5 While none of these studies answers the

looming question of whether judges are excluding too much evidence, this data does provide a greater understanding of the mechanisms by which Daubert, as applied by judges, has heightened the bar
for admissibility and, accordingly, reduced the proportion of evidence
deemed admissible. A careful consideration of this information about
how Daubertis actually applied provides insight into which, if any, criticisms of Daubert correctly identify the doctrine's purported weaknesses. 6 Daubert has had a profound effect on the admissibility of
evidence but not via the means that most critics would guess. In fact,
Daubert's impacts appear to be the result not of the doctrinal test set
forth in the decision, but rather of a cultural phenomenon either
sparked by the decision, or to which the decision has contributed.
Thus, criticisms aimed at the text itself, specifically at the criteria for
reliability (which are not frequently utilized), would seem to miss the
mark. The better questions to ask are why the decision failed to provide criteria that judges actually find useful in drawing these distinctions and what criteria judges are, in fact, using to distinguish between
admissible and inadmissible evidence.
Part I of this Article explains the progression of admissibility standards for expert testimony. Part II provides a general survey of common criticisms of Daubert,particularly in the toxic tort context, such as
problems with the criteria for reliability set forth in the decision,
Daubert's excessive allocation of power to judges, and the judicial exclusion of otherwise valid data. Despite the great volume of paper produced by this discussion, no article, to this author's knowledge, has
offered a comprehensive and conceptually organized overview of such
criticisms (some of which cannot be empirically tested).7 Part III proceeds by reviewing the relevant findings of recent empirical studies of
Daubert's effects and discusses the contribution these findings make to
5. See generally RAND Study, supra note 3; FJC Study, supra note 3; Cheng & Yoon
Study, supra note 4.
6. Unfortunately, some of these criticisms are too nuanced to be addressed by the
relatively general data produced thus far, and scholars concerned with the impacts of
Daubert should be looking to conduct more detailed studies, particularly in the area of
toxic tort litigation.
7. While it may seem one-sided to look only at the criticisms of Daubert without explicitly considering the benefits of this doctrine (particularly when compared to the alternatives), this Article operates under the assumption that since any doctrine is flawed in
certain ways, the discourse surrounding Daubert may be aided by a careful summary of its
alleged failings and consideration of whether these are borne out by empirical research.
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our understanding of how Daubert affects admissibility. Part IV then
considers how this data relates to criticisms of Daubert. Specifically, it
examines the results of a recent study by Professors Cheng and Yoon
and argues that while its methodology is novel, the study's results affirm the hypothesis that Daubert's profound impacts have resulted less
from Daubert's actual doctrinal test and more from the fact that the
decision increased awareness of, and concern about, junk science.
This observation goes a long way in explaining how a decision that was
meant to reflect the liberalized rules of evidence has, in fact, raised
the bar to admissibility. It also begs the serious question of why the
decision did not create a more useful doctrinal test. Before concluding, this Article also briefly makes recommendations for future
research.
I.

The Daubert Decision

In 1993, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Daubert,8 dramatically reshaping the relationship between experts and the courts,
and between law and science. 9 Prior to Daubert, the most commonly
applied standard for admissibility of expert evidence derived from Frye
v. United States.10 Frye held that the proper inquiry is whether the scientific principle or technique from which the evidence is deduced is
generally accepted in the particular field from which it arises.11 The
Frye test calls for 'judges to decide the admissibility of scientific expert
testimony by deferring to the opinions of scientists in the 'particular
field.' "12 It does not require that judges "have any facility with scientific methods to make the admissibility decision," but only mandates
that they develop "some basis for knowing what [it is that] most scien'13
tists believe.
Following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence ("Federal Rules") in the 1970s, courts began questioning the continued applicability of Frye.14 Simultaneously, critics of the Frye test alternately
accused it of being too conservative-requiring that courts wait until a
8.
9.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Joseph Sanders et al., Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 139, 142 (2002) [hereinafter Sanders, Legal Perceptions].
10. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. Id. at 1014; Sanders, Legal Perceptions, supra note 9, at 140.
12. 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1-3.0, at 13 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE].

13.
14.

Id.
Sanders, Legal Perceptions, supra note 9, at 141.
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method is generally accepted-or too lax-deferring to experts in
fields that lack a tradition of rigorous scrutiny. 15 Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the question of
whether the Federal Rules, particularly Rule 702,16 incorporated or
displaced the Frye test. 17 Finding the "rigid 'general acceptance' requirement ...

at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules

and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
'opinion' testimony,"' the Court provided an interpretation of Rule
702 that effectively set a new standard for the admissibility of expert
evidence. 18
Specifically, Daubert requires that for evidence to be admitted it
must be relevant ("assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue") 19 and must meet a standard of "evidentiary reliability." 20 In describing the reliability requirement the
Court stated that the judge should conduct a "preliminary assessment
of whether that reasoning or methodology properly underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." 2 1 Although the
Court acknowledged that this assessment will involve many factors and
explicitly denied creating a checklist, it set out five specific factors that
judges may want to consider: (1) whether the evidence is "falsifiable"
and has been tested, (2) "whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication," (3) what the known or potential rate of error of the technique is, (4) whether standards exist
and are maintained for controlling this technique's operation, and
22
(5) whether the methods and reasoning are generally accepted.
15. 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 1-3.0, at 13. In 1991, Peter Huber, a senior fellow of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, published a widely
distributed book, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM, accusing expert
witnesses of introducing unsubstantiated claims into the courtroom and accusing the court
system of failing to differentiate between these and valid evidence. See generally PETER HuBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (Basic Books 1991).
16. FED. R. EVID. 702. At the time, the rule stated: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise...." Id.

17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
18. Id. at 588 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
19. Id. at 591 (citing FED. R. EVID. 702). The relevance test had been the alternative to
Frye. RAND Study, supra note 3, at 1.
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
21. Id. at 592-93.
22. See id. at 593-95 (interpreted in Sanders, Legal Perceptions, supra note 9, at 141).
Some commentators do not include criteria number 4 above-whether standards exist and
are maintained for controlling this technique's operations-and hence only refer to four
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Thus, Daubertmoved judges into the role of gatekeeper, charged
with the "responsibility of evaluating the scientific validity of the basis
for expert testimony," and "obligated to become familiar with the
methods and culture of science."2 3 While under Fryejudges sometimes
held hearings to ensure that the proffered evidence met the general
acceptance test, they essentially acquiesced to the judgment of the scientific community. 24 The decision effectively told them to "do
whatever the experts tell you to do."2 5 Today, under Daubert,judges

are responsible for questioning the very methods and procedures of
scientists. As Professor Sanders and others have written, the Daubert
test allows judges to play a more active role and provides for a more
nuanced analysis than is possible under Frye, but "it is also true that
this very flexibility makes Daubert a more uncertain test."26 This
change has sparked significant debates among judges, practicing attorneys, legal scholars, and scientists over the past decade.
Before embarking on a summary of the criticisms that have been
leveled at the Daubert decision, it is necessary to briefly mention two
cases that followed Daubert General Electric Co. v. Joiner2 7 and Khumo
Tire Co. v. Carmichael.28 In these decisions, the Supreme Court further
shaped and clarified the Daubert doctrine. Along with the original decision, these cases comprise what is often called the "DaubertTrilogy."
In Joiner, decided in 1997, the Supreme Court clarified that the
standard of review for admissibility decisions (in other words, the standard appellate courts should utilize in reviewing trial court decisions)
is "abuse of discretion." This is a less stringent standard than some
courts had been applying. 29 Subsequently, in 1999, in Kumho Tire, the
Supreme Court stated that "Daubert's general holding-setting forth
the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only to
testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based
on 'technical' and 'other specialized' knowledge."3 0 Broadly speaking,
these decisions thus enhanced judges' power to apply Daubert by excriteria for reliability. For the sake of consistency, I will refer to them as the five criteria or
factors, though numerous quotes within this Article refer to them as "four" factors.
23.
24.

1 MODERN SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 1-3.0, at 13.
Sanders, Legal Perceptions, supra note 9, at 142.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 143.
Id. at 142.
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
See Sanders, Legal Perceptions, supra note 9, at 143.
Id. at 141.
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panding its application (or at least clarifying the breadth of its scope)
and by helping to fortify trial courts' Daubert-baseddecisions.
H.
A.

3
Current Criticisms of Daubert '

Daubert Invokes Judicial Decision Making, Procedural, and
Seventh Amendment Concerns

The first category of criticisms stems from concerns that Daubert
has shifted too much power into the hands of judges. Perhaps the
most common complaint about Daubert is that it forces judges to become amateur scientists, a role they are not well-prepared for and
should not be asked to play. 3 2 In requiring a searching assessment of

the methodology underlying the evidence, Daubert asks judges to acquire a much greater understanding of the science behind the evidence than was asked ofjudges and juries under Frye. Many, including
the dissenters in Daubert,3 3 have wondered whether it is wise to ask
judges to undertake such an assessment when they have little training
34
in scientific methods, reasoning, and research.
To the extent that either the judge or jury must undertake some
analysis of the relevance and reliability of proffered testimony, critics
charge that by placing judges in the position of gatekeepers, Daubert
unnecessarily usurps power from the jury. 35 This argument is generally framed as a question of decision making competency, but also

contains constitutional undertones arising from the Seventh Amendment preservation of the jury trial.3 6 Critics ask whether judges are any
more competent than juries in assessing the reliability and relevance
of scientific evidence. Finding that they may not be, they question
31. Although I have tried to provide some order to these criticisms by organizing
them conceptually, there are significant overlaps, as reflected in the fact that discussions of
certain lines of criticism are included in more than one section.
32. See Michel F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone, Admissibility Standards as Politics-The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 1025, 1039-40 (2003).
33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 600-01 (1993) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).

34. Certain categorical judgments regarding admissibility by judges in recent years
have been criticized by scholars knowledgeable about scientific research. See infra Part II.B.
35. David M. Malone & PaulJ. Zwier, Epistemology After Daubert, Khumo Tire, and the
New Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 74 TEMPLE L. REv. 103, 106 (2001).
36. TELLUS INST., DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL SUPREME COURT RULING YOU'VE
NEVER HEARD OF, A PUBLICATION ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (2003)
[hereinafter TELLUS PUBLICATION].

Fall 2005]

DAUBERT

Daubert's wisdom of effectively taking this power away from the jury,
37
particularly in light of the Seventh Amendment.
Scholars assert that for epistemological reasons it may be preferable to permit the jury to review all minimally acceptable evidence together. 38 Some take issue with the post-Daubert practice of screening
individual pieces of scientific evidence for relevance rather than reviewing all evidence holistically-which, it is argued, is more consistent with scientific practices. 39 The better option may be to allow the
jury to review all methodologically sufficient data and trust the jury to
assign appropriate weight to that data based on its relevance as part of
a whole body of evidence. This holistic approach allows jurors to consider the cumulative relevance and impact of evidence, and this process may bear greater resemblance to the epistemological endeavors
undertaken by scientists or doctors. While theoretically judges could
review multiple pieces of evidence simultaneously, it is not clear how
the Daubert criteria should be applied holistically.
This problem may be exacerbated by courts' tendencies to apply
admissibility and sufficiency standards simultaneously, potentially conflating the two concepts. 40 In Joiner, the Supreme Court appears to
have condoned the consideration of sufficiency concerns in the context of determining admissibility:
We further hold that, because it was within the District Court's discretion to conclude that the studies upon which the experts relied
were not sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to support their conclusions thatJoiner's exposure to PCB's contributed
37. See Malone & Zwier, supra note 35, at 106-07. Cf Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert
Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON
HALL L. REv. 987, 989-94 (2003). For two thorough discussions of whether judges or juries
are more competent and better suited to review expert evidence, see generally Neil Vidma
& Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 1121 (2001); Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the PaternalisticJustificationfor Restrictions on the Admissibility of
Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REv. 881 (2003) [hereinafter Sanders, PaternalisticJustification]. Sanders's piece is particularly interesting in that it explores naturalized epistemology, "an epistemology that builds on and takes its direction from empirical observations
about how we know things." Id. at 884. In other words, the validity of a paternalistic justification for excluding evidence from the jury's view should be determined by reference to
empirical evidence concerning the jury's ability to convey and understand information. Id.
38. See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Lightfor Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science
and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. Rv. 1047, 1068-69 (1999) [hereinafter Intellectual Due
Process] (discussing courts' exclusion of individual studies as irrelevant).
39. Id. at 1068; David Egilman et al., Proving Causation: The Use and Abuse of Medical
and Scientific Evidence Inside the Courtroom--An Epidemiologist'sCritiqueof theJudicialInterpretation of the Daubert Ruling, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 223, 225 (2003).
40. See Intellectual Due Process, supra note 38, at 1072-76 (discussing, inter alia, the
Supreme Court's conflation of these two issues in Joiner).
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to his cancer, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in ex41
cluding their testimony.
The dissent in Joiner expresses regret that this decision allows
courts to consider the sufficiency of individual pieces of evidence
rather than consider the weight of the cumulative evidence. 42 Questions of admissibility arising from a challenge under Daubertand questions of sufficiency arising from a summary judgment motion are
often disposed of in a single hearing. 43 This process arguably facilitates courts' ability to sequentially review the admissibility and sufficiency of each piece of evidence rather than to consider the
44
cumulative impact of all the evidence.
Two other concerns stem from this potential mixing of standards.
First, if courts make sufficiency judgments under the guise of admissibility findings, they may skew admissibility standards. For example, evidence may be excluded after a Daubert hearing not because such
evidence fails to meet the Daubert standard, but instead because the
judge finds the evidence "insufficient." 45 Second, judges may be able
to effectively dismiss cases using sufficiency considerations in the context of a Daubertanalysis even when they would not be able to do so if
forced to address sufficiency considerations directly (for example,
when ruling on a motion for summary judgment) .46
The subtle procedural changes effectuated by the decision may
have profound impacts, even outside the law. Post-Daubert,defendants
may succeed in excluding evidence in a Daubert hearing at a higher
rate than they would have under Frye and subsequently prevail in summary judgment by poking holes in the plaintiffs evidence. Thus, defendants may be less likely to present evidence (specifically studies) of
41.

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1997).

42. Id. at 152-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also expresses concern that
Joineris unfaithful to Daubert's requirement thatjudges only consider the methodology and
not the conclusions of expert's testimony. Id. Whether admissibility and sufficiency parallel
methodology and conclusions is a debate best saved for another day. See generally Carl F.
Cranor et al., JudicialBoundary Drawing and the Need for Context-Sensitive Science in Toxic Torts
After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 16 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 16-17 (1996)
[hereinafter Judicial Boundary Drawing]; David L. Faigman, The Law's Scientific Revolution:
Reflections and Ruminations on the Law's Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 661, 662-65 (2000) (arguing that methodology and conclusions cannot be
severed).
43.

See Intellectual Due Process, supra note 38, at 1074.

44.
45.

Id. at 1075.
See Daniel Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 GA. L. REv. 699, 754-55 (1998).

46.

Id. at 751-55.
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their own if such studies are unnecessary and costly. 47 To the extent
that defendants are less likely to have to present conflicting evidence,
they may be less likely to conduct important studies. 48 Hence, in the
toxic torts context, Daubert may contribute to the already troubling
paucity of knowledge concerning the effects of chemical exposure.
This one-sided presentation of evidence may also exaggerate preexisting cultural differences between the scientific and legal communities. Judges' analyses of scientific evidence may be affected by their
lack of familiarity with the rhetorical styles and cultural values of the
scientific community. 49 As discussed below, scientists generally tend
not to assert claims with nearly the same degree of certainty as do
attorneys. If a judge is reviewing evidence from both parties, she is
forced to acknowledge that scientific evidence generally bears this
rhetorical style. If instead she is reviewing only the plaintiff's evidence
and comparing it with the defendant's legal arguments, she may find
the scientific evidence weak and unconvincing and unintentionally be
swayed by the discordance in these rhetorical styles.
Moreover, some have argued that one benefit to allowing evidence to go to ajury is that particularly egregious behavior by a defendant may be aired, even if the plaintiff ultimately does not prevail in
her case. 50 The plaintiff may gain from the satisfaction of telling her
story to a jury, and the public may benefit from an increased awareness of the defendants' actions. Any negative publicity directed toward
a defendant may have a desirably deterrent effect on the defendant's
harmful behavior.
Finally, federal judges, burdened with heavy dockets, have an incentive to dispose of cases quickly. Often the exclusion of evidence is
fatal to the plaintiff. Entrusting judges with this responsibility could
result in a greater percentage of exclusions and subsequent grants of
summary judgment than might be ideal.

47. Carl F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of
Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform ?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 15 (2001) [hereinafter Scientific Ignorance].
48. See id.
49. Id. at 22. See also discussion infra part I.C.
50. Margaret A. Berger, Complex Litigation at the Millennium: Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court's Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort
Litigation, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 324 (2001).
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B. Judges Misapply Daubert by Placing Excessive Limitations on
the Types of Evidence They Will Admit
Critics have charged that some judges have misinterpreted and
broadened the reach of Daubert by requiring specific types of data and
accordingly excluding otherwise valid data that does not conform to
these requirements. 5 1 One prevalent example is in the toxic tort setting, where some judges have viewed Daubert to require epidemiological data, and in some instances require that such studies demonstrate
a two-fold increase in relative risk.52 The justification for this requirement is that if normally six out of 1000 people will develop a certain
disease and epidemiological data demonstrates that twelve out of 1000
exposed to a particular toxin develop this disease, one can generalize
that for any given individual who is both exposed and develops the
disease, it is more likely than not true that his or her illness was caused
by exposure. 53 At some level, this reasoning is persuasive. Critics, however, point out that other evidence may contribute to establishing the
likelihood that the individual's disease was caused by the defendant's
product. They further argue that it is inequitable to deny all plaintiffs
recovery when some of them (but fewer than half) were in fact injured
by the defendant. 54 Additionally, this stringent requirement is based
upon the assumption that the background cases of a particular illness
and those cases caused by chemical exposure are independent. 55 It is
equally likely that a particular injury-cancer, to state the obvious example-is an "endpoint of a pathologic process whose rate is accelerated" by chemical exposure. 5 6 Exposure may accelerate the onset of a
particular injury in many, or even all people. 57 This complicates the
relationship between background rates and those found in exposed
populations by potentially "underestimat[ing] the degree of risk faced
58
by any individual."
Additionally, such a restriction arguably fails to take into account
the eggshell skull principle, which implies that a defendant is still lia51. See generally TELLUS PUBLICATION, supra note 36.
52. Judicial Boundary Drawing, supra note 42, at 33-40.
53. Id. at 37-38.
54. See Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causationin Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1011, 1035 (2001).
55.
56.

Id. at 1033-34.
Id.

57.
58.

Id.
Id.
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ble to an abnormally sensitive or predisposed plaintiff.59 To remain
consistent with this tort principle, some argue that Daubert should allow for the admission of methodologically sound evidence. This would
demonstrate that although exposure to agent X is not likely to cause
harm to the average person, the plaintiff was particularly susceptible
to this particular harm, and in the expert's opinion the exposure was
60
more likely than not the cause of the plaintiffs illness.
More significantly, scientists and lawyers question the basic as61
sumption that epidemiological data is necessary to show causation.
They emphasize that scientists do not specifically require this type of
data to establish causation. 62 Such a requirement disadvantages plaintiffs given the dearth of epidemiological data, difficulty and cost of
conducting such studies, and shortcomings of existing studies. 63 This
argument also applies to other types of evidence that have in the past
been excluded by certain courts, including animal studies 64 and dif65
ferential diagnosis.
As addressed earlier, judges often apply the Daubertfactors to individual pieces of evidence instead of considering the relevance and
reliability of the body of proffered evidence as a whole. Once again,
reviewing the cumulative weight of evidence may provide for more
accurate assessments of the relevance and reliability of evidence, at
least insofar as this is the means by which scientists often assess such
evidence. While some would argue that a piecemeal analysis is supported by Daubert and endorsed by Joiner, a holistic analysis of evidence may not be inconsistent with the decision.
C.

Daubert Offers a Flawed Concept of "Good" Evidence or
Incomplete Instructions on How to Identify It

Much criticism has been directed toward the content of the decision itself. As referenced above, critics argue that Daubertencourages a
piecemeal analysis of evidence and a checklist approach to individual
59.

Scientific Ignorance,supra note 47, at 44-45. The eggshell skull rule is "the principle

that a defendant is liable for a plaintiff's unforeseeable and uncommon reactions to the
defendant's negligent or intentional act." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY 218 (Pocket ed. 1996).

60. Id.
61. JudicialBoundary Drawing, supra note 42, at 32.
62. Id.
63. See generally Scientific Ignorance, supra note 47.
64. Id. at 27.
65. See generally Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential
Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causationin Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2001).
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studies. 66 They express concern that the admissibility criteria embraced by the decision are oversimplified, butjudges nonetheless may
be tempted to consider the factors to be a cookbook recipe for good
science. 67 Scholars also complain that the decision encourages a sequential instead of cumulative assessment of evidence. 68 They argue
that a particular study may not, for example, be statistically significant
at the .05 level due to a small sample size, but when considered in
tandem with additional studies or different types of evidence, may
contribute to a persuasive body of evidence. 69 According to one publication, good science proceeds by "assessing totality of the evidence,"
not by conducting a separate analysis of individual factors.7 0 Scholars
are concerned that judges will apply the reliability criteria in a formulaic manner. Those criteria, once again, are: (1) whether the evidence is "falsifiable" and has been tested, (2) peer review and
publication, (3) the technique's known or potential rate of error, (4)
whether standards for controlling the technique's operation exist, and
71
(5) the general acceptance of the methods and reasoning.
Critics also charge that Daubert, like many multi-factored tests, is
too flexible and leaves too much discretion in the hands of the
judge. 72 Its application is likely to produce inconsistent, arbitrary, and
unpredictable results.7 3 This potential problem is exacerbated by the
fact that the decision only gently recommends use of the five reliability factors (as opposed, in some sense, to the converse concern that
judges will use these factors in a cookbook type fashion). Furthermore, the actual factors chosen by the court may be faulted. Daubert
has been criticized for espousing an over-reliance on peer review and
statistical significance. 74 Recent scholarship has suggested that the
66. See JudicialBoundary Drawing, supra note 42, at 25-26.
67. Id. at 21-27.
68. TELLUS PUBLICATION, supra note 36, at 7.
69. See Judicial Boundary Drawing, supra note 42, at 34. Statistical significance is the
"probability that the observed relationship (e.g., between variables) or difference (e.g.,
between means) in a sample occurred by pure chance ("luck of the draw") and that in the
population from which the sample was drawn, no such relationship or difference exists."
StatSoft, Elementary Concepts in Statistics, http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/esc.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2005). Researchers often require at a minimum that a study be significant at the .05 level. This means that there is only a 5% probability that the relationship
between variables or means is just the result of chance. Id.
70. Id.
71. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993).
72. See JudicialBoundary Drawing,supra note 42, at 5.
73. See id.
74. Joelle Anne Moreno, Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future Consequences of the
Fact-Based Validity Standard, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 89, 95 (2003).
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peer review process may be faulted and may not, in fact, be an accurate indication of "good science." 75 Statistical significance, particularly
at the .05 level, is ideal but may not be a necessary or practical
standard.

76

Daubert is also subject to the criticism that it fails to adequately
77
address the problem of causal uncertainty in the toxic tort context.
Given that our knowledge about the chemical universe is severely limited and the mechanisms by which chemicals cause illness are largely
unknown, it may not be appropriate to treat causation in toxic tort
cases in the same manner as it is treated in other tort contexts. 78 The
Court could have addressed this problem by adopting a probabilistic
notion of causation-for example-by admitting evidence demonstrating a less than 50% chance of causation and permitting juries to
give partial awards based on the probabilistic likelihood of causation.
Alternatively, the Court could have required that once a plaintiff
makes a showing of a scintilla of evidence, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendant. 79 This could compensate for the burden otherwise
placed on plaintiffs who lack the resources to conduct their own studies and thus overcome the current state of ignorance concerning the
effects of most chemicals. As discussed below, this issue of causation
exposes larger conflicts between the cultures and aims of science and
the law.
Finally, Dauberthas been criticized for incorporating a faulty philosophy of science. Some critics debate whether the decision incorporated a view of science as an objective enterprise or as a social and
cultural phenomenon.8 0 Others charge that the decision struck an incoherent synthesis between these differing views on the true nature of
science. 81 On a more positive note, some scholars argue that Daubertis
sufficiently flexible to allow judges to recognize the social, institutional, and rhetorical aspects of science and not focus on an idealized
75.

Id.

76.

See Egilman, supra note 39,

at 236-39.

77. See Scientific Ignorance, supra note 47, at 46.
78. See generally id. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"PublicLaw" Vision of the Tort System, 97 RAiv. L. REV. 851 (1984), for an excellent discussion of this problem (published prior to Daubert).
79. Scientific Ignorance, supra note 47, at 47.
80. David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of
Expertise and Interdisciplinarityin Federal Courts, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 685, 691-92 (2000).
81. Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemology
and Legal Process, 15 CAozo L. REV. 2183, 2198-207 (1994).
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version of it when rendering their decisions. 82 In practice, judges
sometimes may fall prey to an idealized notion of science (perhaps
driven by a strict adherence to the five Daubert factors), but select
cases provide examples ofjudges taking a more "pragmatic" approach
towards science, one that arguably provides a better mirror of how
scientists actually operate. 8 3 Unfortunately, a thorough discussion of
this issue could dwarf the remainder of this Article and thus should be
left for another day.
D.

The Best Description of Good Science Is Not the Best
Description of Good Scientific Evidence

Emerging from recent scholarship is a thread of criticisms that
addresses the conflicting cultures of science and the law and asks
whether applying the scientific community's best description of good
science to evidence presented in a court of law necessarily and unde84
sirably entails importing scientific values into the judicial sphere.
This general sentiment is that "[i]f scientific approaches to distributions of mistakes or conceptions of accuracy dominate in the law, they
risk distorting the law's goals."8 5 These criticisms may, of course, be
applicable to any standards for the admissibility of evidence. In deciding Daubertas it did, the Supreme Court may have missed an opportunity to develop a formula for translating scientific knowledge into the
context of litigation without carrying over certain characteristics of science that create biases in the courtroom.
Carl Cranor, a professor of philosophy at University of California,
Riverside, has observed that science (particularly toxicology) and the
law place different values on two types of errors: false positives and
false negatives.8 6 False positives are erroneous findings of causation
when none, in fact, exists. False negatives are erroneous findings of no
causation when one does exist. Tort norms aim to achieve a balance
between errors that benefit the plaintiff and those that benefit the
82. See generally David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the Daubert
Trilogy Need to Know About the Social, Institutional,and Rhetorical-AndNot Just the Methodological-Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2003).
83. Id.
84. See generally Scientific Ignorance, supra note 47.
85. Id. at 19. Cf Bert Black, Francisco J. Ayala & Carol Saffran-Brinks, Science and the
Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REv. 715, 753
(1994) ("We believe lawyers and judges will accomplish the task of understanding science
best if they ... rely on the same process of review that scientists use.").
86. Scientific Ignorance, supra note 47, at 19-25.
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defendant.8 7 In other words, tort law is indifferent as to whether the
plaintiff erroneously recovers (false positive) or the defendant erroneously is found not liable (false negative). 88 The hope is that a relative
number of each will approximately cancel each other out. In contrast,
scientists and scientific bodies, through culturally regulated behavior
(peer review, etc.), and because of the degree of statistical significance
generally demanded of studies, place a greater emphasis on avoiding
false positives.8 9 This effect is due largely to the manner in which
scientists set error rates in experiments (generally allowing a greater
number of false negatives in order to meet strict limits on the percentage of false positives).90 The result is that when scientific studies are
introduced into the legal context, they bring along an inherent bias
against finding a causal link between a chemical agent and physical
harm. 9 1
Another source of tension identified by Cranor concerns rhetorical differences between science and the law.9 2 While law embraces the
ideal of the zealous advocate, the rhetorical style adopted by scientists
could be characterized as hedging. 9 3 While good litigators express a
strong and genuine-sounding commitment to their arguments, scientists often exhibit a limited commitment to claims. The result is that
when judges are called upon to consider the adequacy of a party's
scientific claims, they may make an inaccurate assessment because the
evidence may sound comparatively unconvincing. In theory this problem should affect evidence presented by both the plaintiff and the
defendant equally and hence should balance out. 94 However, as discussed above, it is plausible that under Daubert, defendants are
presenting considerably less evidence than they previously did, instead
relying on attacks to the plaintiff's evidence. If this is the case, then
judges' culturally-based disinclination to find scientific evidence persuasive may regularly work to the disadvantage of plaintiffs.

87. Id. at 19-20.
88. Id. at 19.
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 18-24.
93. Id. at 22-23.
94. For a discussion of the reverse problem, where judges are too persuaded by the
authoritative force of science, see Caudill & LaRue, supra note 82, at 43-48.
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Critics are also concerned by inconsistencies in how lawyers and
scientists understand causation. 95 The law demands certainty and finality and generally forces its participants to render decisions and verdicts in binary pairs, such as causation/no causation and liability/no
liability, even where evidence is ambiguous, uncertain, complex, and
immature. 96 In contrast, the scientific enterprise generally embraces
probability and uncertainty and does not require the occasionally premature dichotomization of outcomes often required by the courts. As
Cranor points out, medical scientists find the question of individual
causation unanswerable, and scientists generally are reticent to reach
absolute conclusions. 9 7 Statutes of limitations, the principle of res
judicata, and the need to promptly compensate sick plaintiffs limit the
court's ability to accommodate the slow accumulation of sometimes
inconsistent scientific data. Furthermore, one scholar has proposed
that while Daubert captured an accurate view of how scientists approach the problem of "deciding which information to consider when
deciding questions of scientific fact," this view necessarily and frequently leads to uncertainty with regard to causation. 98 Daubert may
have been a missed opportunity at addressing these problems,
(though, admittedly, it is not clear that an evidentiary standard is the
best means by which to address these problems).
E. Judge-Made Rules Under DaubertViolate the Principles of Erie
Brooklyn Law School Professor Margaret Berger has argued that
judge-made laws under Daubert,such as the exclusion of animal studies or epidemiological data that demonstrates a relative risk of less
than 2.0, may violate the principles of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins99 when
applied in a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction. 10 0 In Erie, the
Supreme Court decided that a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction may apply federal procedural law, but must apply state sub02
stantive law. 10 1 The Court's subsequent decision in Hanna v. Plumer
held that where a federal rule is adopted under the Rules Enabling
95. Johlle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans
that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REv. 1033, 1060-65

(2001).
96. See id. at 1062.
97. Scientific Ignorance, supra note 47, at 7-8.
98. Hedi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1, 2 (1995).

99.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

100.
101.

Berger, supra note 50, at 291.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.

102.

380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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Act' 0 3 or a statute authorized by Congress, federal judges are "to follow federal practice even in the face of a contrary state rule, unless the
federal practice 'transgresses ... the terms of the Enabling Act [or a]
constitutional restriction.' 1 0 4 As to a rule adopted pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, Erie would only be violated if such a rule violated
the Act's prohibition that a rule "not abridge, enlarge or modify the
10 5
substantive rights of the litigant.'
However, Berger points out that when judges establish black-letter policy rules, excluding animal studies, for example, they are no
longer applying the text of the rule as in Hanna, but instead are moving "considerably beyond the scope of Rule 702."106 Federal Rule 702
nowhere requires the exclusion of animal studies or, for that matter, a
doubling of risk. 1 07 In a subsequent case, Gasperiniv. Centerfor Humanities, Inc.,108 the Supreme Court clarified that the virtually automatic
acceptance of federal rules dictated in Hanna does not apply to federal judge-made procedural rules. 10 9 The Court went on to say that if
a state practice exists that conflicts with a federal practice (not with
the text of a federal rule), the lower court must consider whether the
state version is substantive or merely procedural. 1 0 If it is substantive,
the lower court must apply the state version."' Berger then explains
that while it is difficult to determine which of a series of tests the court
should apply to decide whether a state practice is substantive, each of
the tests "points in the direction of applying state law when the issue
2
concerns a policy-based rule on proving causation.""
In light of this jurisprudence, Berger is persuaded that "l[t] he
principles that the Court has at various times identified as underlying
Erie and its progeny all point to a need to consider state law to determine whether a federal court may apply its own judge-made rule on
the admissibility of expert proof about causation in a toxic tort
113
action."
103.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000).

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Berger, supra note 50, at 310.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 312.
Id.
518 U.S. 415 (1996).

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Berger, supra note 50, at 312-13.
Id.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 316.
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Empirical Data Regarding Daubert's Effects

This Part reviews the findings of recent studies designed to determine how Daubert has affected admissibility determinations. These
studies not only help answer questions about how judges are applying
the decision and how parties to litigations have responded to this new
standard, but also shed light on criticisms of Daubert.
A.

RAND Study Reflects Judicial Scrutiny and the Limited Role of
Reliability Factors

In 2001, the RAND Institute for Civil Justice issued a report analyzing trends in 399 federal district court opinions issued between January 1980 and June 1999.114 This study has been widely cited as
providing some of the best evidence that Daubert indeed heightened
admissibility standards. By reviewing pre- and post-Daubert decisions,
the researchers were able to investigate whether, and in what ways,
admissibility decisions have been influenced by Daubert. Overall, the
study showed numerous changes in the wake of Daubert that the authors believe are not merely the impact of general trends in litigation
115
or changes in the composition of the federal bench.
Following Daubert the authors found a significant rise in the proportion of evidence excluded. 1 6 They noted an increase in the proportion of rulings on challenges discussing reliability, suggesting that
parties were more frequently challenging evidence based on its relia118 It
bility. 1 7 The success rate of these challenges increased as well.
appears that judges were scrutinizing reliability more carefully, applying stricter standards and, as a result, excluding an increasing proportion of evidence. 11 9 For example, the study found that for evidence
based on physical science in products liability cases in the Third Cir114. RAND Study, supra note 3, at xiii. The RAND Institute for Civil Justice is an independent research program within the RAND Corporation, a non-profit think tank.
115. Id. For example, the authors found that following the decision, judges initially
started scrutinizing physical science-type evidence more closely, the signature trend that
would be expected if they were basing their review on the Daubert decision. The authors
came to the conclusion that Daubert was at least partially responsible for subsequent
changes in admissibility despite finding an increase in challenges to expert testimony just
before the decision was rendered, possibly suggesting the beginning of a trend that predated Daubert (however, this finding was not statistically significant). RAND Study, supra
note 3, at xv.
116. RAND Study, supra note 3, at 55.
117. Id. at xv.
118. Id.
119. I at xv-xvi.
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and midcuit, the exclusion rates spiked to 70% between mid-1995
120
1996, up from 53% for the two years preceding Daubert.
To determine whether this apparently greater scrutiny of reliability is the result of substituting terms (assessing "reliability" instead of
an expert's "qualifications," for example) rather than an actual
change in how carefully judges are reviewing evidence overall, the authors looked for trends in how judges evaluate relevance and qualifications as well as reliability. 121 If judges were simply switching
terminology, one would expect to see a decrease in decisions discussing relevance or qualifications to account for the increase in discussion of reliability. Instead, the researchers found trends in successful
challenges based on relevance and qualifications that paralleled that
are scrutinizing
of reliability, 122 leading them to conclude that judges
123
testimony more carefully with regard to all criteria.
Interestingly, this trend changed in 1997, when the percentage of
challenges and their success rate started to decline. 124 Post-1997, the
study shows a gradual decrease in the percentage of challenged evidence found unreliable. 2 5 The authors interpret this data to reflect
changing behavior by parties in response to the tightening of standards, specifically inferring that "parties proposing evidence either
did not propose or withdrew evidence not meeting the new standards,
or better tailored evidence they did propose to fit the new standards.' 26 They also hypothesize that parties challenging evidence
may have been so encouraged by past success that they cast a wider
hence the propornet in terms of what evidence they challenged, and
27
dropped.1
have
may
challenges
successful
tion of
Daubert appears to have had a significant impact on motions for
summary judgment: summary judgment was requested and granted at
a considerably higher frequency following the decision. It was requested in one-third of challenges to evidence and granted half the
time. 128 This trend was particularly fatal for cases, with 88% of motions made in challenges to evidence proposed by plaintiffs and nearly
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

xvi.
xv.
49-50.
52.
xvii-xviii.
xvii.

56.
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90% of judgments coming down against plaintiffs. 129 The success rate
of such challenges does appear to have fallen off slightly in the latter
130
years of the study.
Beyond the oft-cited general observations above, the RAND Study
also contains some interesting specific findings that bear on the mechanisms of how judges apply Daubert. The first finding concerns the
role of general acceptance in judicial evaluations for reliability. Despite criticisms that Daubert tightened admissibility standards, the decision itself appeared to liberalize the standard by demoting general
acceptance to one of five factors to be considered. 13 1 Thus, it appeared to allow methodologically sound minority opinions. Nevertheless, the actual effect of the decision has been largely to the contrary.
The RAND Study found that before Daubert, general acceptance was
not commonly used as a factor for admissibility, but when it was addressed, general acceptance was usually sufficient for admissibility. 1 3 2
After the decision, general acceptance was no longer sufficient. 133
These findings are not necessarily inconsistent with Daubertin that the
decision reduces the significance of general acceptance. The surprising finding, however, was that after Daubert, a lack of general acceptance was as much a barrier to admission as before, and possibly a
greater one. 13 4 Using regression analysis, the authors found that general acceptance pre-Daubertwas not a good indicator of whether evidence would be found reliable or not, but general acceptance postDaubertwas, in fact, a good indicator of reliability. 135 According to the
authors of the study, there is "[n] o indication it became easier for
novel evidence to be admitted." 13 6 This seems contrary to Daubert's
thrust toward a greater emphasis on methodology and procedure and
decreased emphasis on the majority viewpoint.
Another revealing finding in the RAND Study is the frequency
with which specific factors were discussed in decisions on admission.
Following Daubert, all five factors were addressed more frequently. 13 7
The trend in the discussion of these factors roughly parallels the trend
in the discussion of reliability generally: both increased significantly
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 56, 62.
Id. at 56.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993).
RAND Study, supra note 3, at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 40.
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after the decision, peaked, and decreased starting around 1997.138 Interestingly, there was also an increase in discussion of non-Daubertfactors after the decision, and this discussion continued to increase in
frequency throughout the entire time period analyzed. 13 9 Thus, while
the frequency of Daubert factors eventually declined, the frequency of
non-Daubertfactors did not. One factor in particular, "clarity and coherence of underlying method and procedures," showed a continual
and dramatic increase in frequency of discussion.1 40 The authors' interpretation of these findings is that immediately after the decision,
judges, acting prudently, stuck to the listed factors, but once they
gained greater familiarity with the role of scrutinizing evidence, they
became more confident in their freedom and ability to consider other
factors.141

Finally, as discussed above, in the wake of Daubert,judges applied
greater scrutiny to factors other than reliability, even though the decision did not change the standards for such review. Judges more frequently discussed and excluded evidence on the basis of relevance
and qualifications, 142 increasingly examined all evidence (not just
hard science), 1 43 and increasingly focused on theory, methods, and
144
procedures underlying expert evidence.
B.

Federal Judicial Center Study Results Affirm RAND Study
Findings

A second comprehensive study on the impacts of Daubertwas conducted by the Federal Judicial Center.1 45 The researchers conducted
three surveys: two were distributed to federal judges in 1991 and 1998,
and one was distributed to attorneys in 1999.146 The three surveys contained questions concerning the judges' and attorneys' general exper138.

Id. at 42.

139. Id. at 43.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 40-41.
142. In the authors' words, "[i]t appears that once judges started acting as more active
gate keepers, they more carefully examined relevance, qualifications, and other considerations for admitting evidence, in addition to reliability." Id. at 61-62.
143. Id. at 63.
144. Id. at 62.
145. FJC Study, supra note 3. The Federal Judicial Center is the education and research
agency for the federal courts.
146. Id. at 311.
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iences with expert testimony and their specific experiences in recent
civil trials. 147
Notably, in reviewing the selected cases, the authors found that
the percentage of trials containing experts testifying for plaintiffs and
the percentage containing experts testifying for defendants remained
relatively consistent from 1991 to 1998.148 The mean number of experts testifying decreased slightly, but limits to the 1991 data prevented the authors from deciphering whether this reduction in
149
experts was particular to defendants or plaintiffs.
With regard to admissibility generally, the results of this study are
consistent with those of the RAND Study. In 1998, judges reported
that they were more likely to scrutinize expert testimony and that they
were less likely to find it admissible. 150 They reported limiting or excluding expert testimony in 41% of the 1998 cases, versus 25% of the
cases referenced in the 1991 survey.15 1 As the authors point out, the
surveys only contained questions about trials that contained some expert testimony and did not capture information on cases in which all
expert testimony was ruled inadmissible.1 5 2 Thus, the true rate of expert testimony exclusion may be higher (particularly given the increase in in limine motions, discussed below). 153 Furthermore, 33% of
judges in 1998 reported that they admitted evidence less frequently
than they did prior to Daubert.154 Sixty-one percent of attorneys agreed
that judges were admitting less evidence. 155 This assessment is supported by the finding that " U] udges who ruled on expert admissibility
issues in the cases sampled for the recent survey permitted 59% of
cases to proceed to trial without limitation on the evidence, whereas
judges who ruled on admissibility in the early survey permitted a full
1
75% of cases to proceed without limitation."

56

In Daubert's wake, motions in limine (resulting in pre-trial or
"Daubert' hearings) have been used more frequently as a device for
addressing admissibility. 15 7 According to the 1991 study, prior to the
147.

involved
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 309. Judges were asked about their most recent civil trial and the attorneys

were questioned about it as well. Id.
Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 322.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 321.
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decision, admissibility questions were most often raised at trial. 158 By
contrast, according to the 1998 survey, admissibility issues arose most
frequently in the context of motions in limine.159 Judges reported regular use of Daubert hearings on admissibility of evidence, with 77%
reporting that they "commonly held a Daubert hearing on evidence
admissibility," 160 up from 51% in the 1991 survey. 16 1 Furthermore,
45% ofjudges reported that they were hearing pre-trial motions more
frequently than they had been pre-Daubert, and 56% of attorneys
agreed. 162 In light of these findings, the authors were surprised to discover that 60% of judges stated that their use of procedures had not
changed very much since Daubert.163 The authors conclude, nonetheless, that "Daubert gives every appearance of having affected the judi1 64
cial approach to handling expert evidence in federal civil cases."
More than half of attorneys surveyed reported making greater
uses of motions in limine to exclude testimony. 165 A significant number of attorneys reported making more objections to admissibility of
expert testimony at trial (41%) and also making more motions for
summary judgment (24%).166 This is supported by the finding that
after Daubert there was a significant increase in the frequency with
which judges ruled on admissibility following a motion in limine, from
32% to 72%.167
Overall, the study strongly supports the hypothesis that since
Daubert parties are challenging expert evidence more frequently and
at an earlier stage in litigation. Judges are excluding more evidence,
and parties are making more motions for summary judgment. As with
the RAND Study, it is useful to look at some of the findings in detail to
better understand the mechanism by which Daubert has caused these
changes.
158. Id.
159. Id. When admissibility was raised, in 72% of the cases it arose in a motion in limine.
However, such issues still often emerged in response to an objection made at trial-64% of
cases contained admissibility questions raised at the trial phase. Id.
160. Id. at 326 (although 29% ofjudges indicated that they only held such hearings in
cases with "difficult scientific evidence"). Id.
161. Id. at 327.
162. Id. at 329.
163. Id. Possible explanations for this discrepancy are that judges view these changes
simply as a matter of degree, that the increase in hearings was caused by the 40% who
reported changes in management of expert testimony, or that judges are poorly assessing
changes in their procedures. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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Interestingly, the authors note that while 18% of the judges who
excluded evidence based their decision in part on a finding that the
methods and principles of the expert were unreliable, judges rarely
discussed the specific Daubert criteria for reliability. 168 In cases where
evidence was excluded, judges identified problems with general acceptance, peer review, and insufficient theory testing less than 8% of
the time. 169 Issues with falsifiability and error rates were discussed in
170
less than 2% of these cases.
The study also found that the reasons for limiting or excluding
testimony have not changed significantly in the wake of Daubert.171 In
1998, as in 1991, most exclusions were based on the judge's assessment that the evidence was "not relevant, the witness was not quali172
fied, or the testimony would not have assisted the trier of fact."
C. Groscup Study
In 2002, Jennifer Groscup-now a professor at John Jay College
of Criminal Justice-along with other professors and researchers, published a study looking at the effects of Daubert on federal and state
criminal cases. 173 The researchers reviewed appellate decisions, cod174
ing for over 100 variables related to the admissibility of evidence.
They recorded the length of discussion of some of these variables and
coded for the influence of select factors on the decisions. 175 In addition, they noted whether the testimony did or did not meet certain
17 6
criteria.
As indicated, this study only concerned criminal cases,' 77 whereas
this Article focuses on civil cases.' 7 8 While the findings discussed be168. Id. at 323.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 330.
172. Id.
173. Groscup Study, supra note 3.
174. Id. at 342-44. As indicated, supra note 22, some scholars do not recognize a fifth
factor.
175. Id. at 343.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 342.
178. In contrast to the RAND and FJC Studies, the Groscup Study found no change in
the basic rates of admission at the trial and appellate court following Daubert. Id. at 345.
This finding is somewhat surprising in light of the studies above, but likely is the result of
differences between the criminal and civil settings and may be complicated by the fact that
investigators only reviewed cases on appeal. See id. at 345-46. The authors note that:
One explanation for the lack of any changes in the observed rates of admission
before versus after Daubert is that admissibility depends on the party offering the
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low are therefore of limited value in determining how Daubert impacted admissibility in civil cases, some of the key results of this study
are consistent with those found in the two studies of civil cases discussed above. The Groscup Study, therefore, lends some support to
the patterns of judicial application of Daubert identified above.
Consistent with the studies of civil cases, the authors of this study
noted that the "most mysterious impact of the Daubert decision is the
179
lack of discussion devoted to the four Daubert criteria themselves."
They found no increase in the length of discussion devoted to falsifiability, peer review, or error rate, and a decrease in the length of
discussion of general acceptance.1 8 0 The authors observed that these
factors are "rarely given more than a cursory mention" in appellate
decisions18 ' and that judges "rarely made statements that the four
Daubert criteria were or were not met."1 8 2 The most interesting finding
in this study was the outcome of a model the authors developed to
determine which judgment criteria best predict whether evidence will
be deemed admissible. The authors failed to find a significant relationship between the four Daubert factors and admissibility.18 3 Instead,
the most predictive factors were whether the testimony assists the trier
of fact, is not regarded as prejudicial, is regarded as relevant, is re84
garded as reliable, and whether the expert is deemed qualified.
This finding suggests that the courts appear to be relying on the retestimony. The party for whom the key expert testified was significantly related to
admission at both the trial court, X2(1, N= 686) = 512.70, p < .001, and the appellate court levels, XY(1, N = 670) = 251.79, p < .001. At both adjudicative levels,
experts proffered by the prosecution were more likely to be admitted than experts proffered by defendants.
Id. at 346. See also D. Michael Risinger, NavigatingExpert Reliability:Are CriminalStandardsof
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REv. 99 (2000), for a discussion of the differences
in outcomes of challenges by civil versus criminal defendants.
179. Groscup Study, supra note 3, at 353.
180. Id. As an interesting side note, the authors did observe that decisions contained
lengthier discussions of error rate and general acceptance for cases involving scientific
experts than for those involving other types of experts. Id.
181. Id. at 367. In contrast, discussion of Daubertgenerally was "lengthy." Id. at 365. The
authors also note that there was a significant drop off in discussion and importance rating
of general admissibility. Id. at 367. This is surprising given its increased influence noted in
the RAND Study. They speculate that after Daubertjudges may just be less willing to discuss
general acceptance, even if it does factor into their decisions. Id. at 366-67.
182. Id. at 359.
183. Id. at 353-56.
184. Id. at 363. While the authors did observe an increase in influence for falsifiability,
peer review, and error rate, they also noted that "the criteria with the highest ratings of
influence were derived from the Federal Rules of Evidence, namely assisting the trier of
fact, expert qualifications, relevance of the testimony, and potential for prejudicial impact . . . ." Id. at 354.
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quirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence more than the Daubert
18 5
factors.
Overall, the authors conclude that while Daubert has caused
judges to take on the responsibility of gatekeepers, judges have responded by applying the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence more stringently rather than utilizing the factors identified in
18 6
the Daubert decision.
D.

Cheng & Yoon Study Considers Whether a State's Choice of
Frye or Daubert Has Any Practical Significance

187
Edward Cheng and Albert Yoon took a different approach.
They focused on state courts, some of which adopted the Daubertstandard and others of which adhere to the old Frye standard. Cheng and
Yoon asked whether a state's adoption of one standard or another
actually matters. To answer this question, they took the novel approach of looking at removal rates from state to federal court in tort
cases in order to measure litigants' perceptions of whether they will
fare better under one standard or the other.
Cheng and Yoon first looked at a narrow region, considering removal rates in Connecticut and the Eastern District of New York
("EDNY"). In 1997, Connecticut adopted the Daubert standard,
whereas New York continues to adhere to Frye.188 Using data from the
EDNY as a control group, the authors analyzed whether removal rates
in Connecticut changed when the state moved from Frye to Daubert.189
Somewhat surprisingly, they found no statistically significant changes
190
correlating with this adoption of Daubert over Frye.
Expanding this study to sixteen states, they found similar results. 191 Accounting for year to year and state to state variations,
Cheng and Yoon determined statistically that "the DAUBERT variable-whether a state follows the Daubert standard in the year in question-has a vanishingly small effect on removal rate. DAUBERT
contributes only five-thousandths of a percentage point to a state's re185. Id. at 354. The authors note, however, that the courts paid more attention to the
Daubert factors when assessing scientific evidence, and caution that parties presenting scientific evidence should still address these factors. Id. at 369.
186. Id. at 370.
187. Cheng & Yoon Study, supra note 4.
188. Id. at 475.
189. Id. at 486.
190. Id. at 488.
191. Id. at 498.
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moval rate, and the result is not statistically significant." 19 2 This effect
remained even when the authors tweaked various factors to account
193
for the differing sizes of jurisdictions' caseloads.
Finding that a state's choice of evidentiary standards does not
19 4
have a statistically significant effect on removal rates in that state,
the authors inferred that a "state's adoption of Fye or Daubert makes
no difference in practice. 1 9 5 By the authors' own admission, this assertion relies on at least three bulky assumptions: (1) that procedural
changes impact defendants' decisions to remove (in some way that
would actually be captured by this analysis), (2) that defense counsel
can accurately predict the "practical ramifications of the scientific admissibility standard adopted in his or her jurisdiction,"' 19 6 and (3) that
the results are not skewed by cases in which the case fails to meet the
19 7
amount in controversy requirement ($75,000) for removal.
Though they acknowledge the significance of these assumptions,
Cheng and Yoon conclude that their study lends support to the theory
that the actual doctrinal test enumerated in Daubert is substantially less
important than the awareness the decision generated. 19 8 They assert:
The results of this study are consistent with the theory that the
power of the Supreme Court's Daubert decision was not so much in
its formal doctrinal test, but rather in its ability to create greater
awareness about the problems of junk science .... [C]ourts apply
some generalized level of scrutiny when considering the reliability
of scientific evidence, regardless of the governing standard. If ac-

cepted, this thesis suggests that debates about the practical merits
and drawbacks of adopting a Frye versus a Daubert standard are
largely superfluous.' 99
Cheng and Yoon then recommend that attempts at changing or
improving the way courts treat scientific evidence could be more effective if "advocates for rigorous use of scientific evidence shifted their
focus away from tinkering with doctrinal tests and instead toward
'softer' solutions that increase the judiciary's understanding of scientific concepts and processes." 20 0 One such example of a softer solution
192. Id.
193. Id. at 499.
194. Id. at 503.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 508.
197. Id. at 506-08.
198. Id. at 503-09.
199. Id. at 503. The authors point out in a footnote that theoretical discussions about
the differences still have value. Id. at 503 n.62.
200. Id. at 504.
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is focusing more on how judges are educated. 20 1 Ultimately, the authors conclude that taken against the background of numerous studies showing that Daubert did have a substantial impact on how
scientific evidence is treated, their study "strongly suggests that
Daubert'sinfluence was not from its doctrinal reform, but from its edu20 2
cative function."
E.

Other Studies

Numerous other studies have focused on aspects of judicial gatekeeping in the wake of Daubert. Much literature has been written addressing the proficiency ofjudges and jurors in assessing the quality of
expert evidence. Probably the most cited study is Sophia Gatowski's
survey of 400 state court trial judges, which found that 82% of judges
demonstrated a clear understanding of general acceptance and 71%
of judges understood the utility of the peer review process. As to the
peer review process, only 4% of judges demonstrated a clear understanding of falsifiability and of error rates. 20 3 Furthermore, 73% of
judges had no experience with epidemiological data. In addition, 96%
of judges reported that they had not received instruction about general scientific methods and principles (even though the majority had
received some CLE training).204 Unfortunately, a thorough discussion
about the relative abilities of judges and jurors to separate bad from
good evidence is beyond the scope of this Article, but it bears noting
that some studies have cast considerable doubt on the frequent assumption that judges necessarily are superior in this task. 205
Another very interesting study is Michael Risinger's comparison
of the outcomes of challenges to expert testimony in civil and criminal
cases. 20 6 Most significantly, Risinger found that in federal appellate
and district court opinions as well as state court decisions, civil defendants prevail in their challenges to expert testimony most of the time,
while criminal defendants "virtually always lose their reliability chal201. Id.
202. Id. at 505.
203. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L.
REv. 1121, 1172-73 (2001) (discussing Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey ofJudges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 433 (2001)).

204.
205.
view of
206.

Id. at 1172.
See generally Sanders, PaternalisticJustification,supra note 37, for a thorough rerelevant literature.
Risinger, supra note 178.
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lenges. '2 0 7 For example, Risinger notes that in the district court opinions he reviewed, civil defendants succeed in rejecting two-thirds of
plaintiffs' evidence while prosecutors' challenged evidence was admit20 8
ted in eleven out of twelve cases.
IV.
A.

Implications of Empirical Research
Major Findings-Judges Have Adopted the Spirit, if Not the
Text of Daubert

Taken together, these studies support two significant and somewhat paradoxical conclusions: Dauberthas indeed raised the bar to admissibility, butjudges are not frequently utilizing the reliability factors
suggested in the decision. In other words, while judges are scrutinizing evidence more carefully, as required by Daubert,they appear to be
developing their own criteria for determining admissibility.
First, Daubert raised the bar for admissibility in civil cases. According to both the RAND Study and the FJC Study, the frequency of pretrial hearings and motions for summary judgment has increased, and
most importantly, judges are fulfilling their role as gatekeepers, excluding more evidence than before.2 09 General changes in judicial
practices and attitudes toward certain types of cases may have contributed to this change. Yet the evidence above suggests that the Daubert
decision, whether directly or indirectly, has had a significant impact
on these practices. As a result of Daubert challenges to admissibility,
2 10
rates of exclusion increased significantly after 1993 in civil cases.
Judges began to scrutinize only physical-science type evidence more
carefully. 2 11 This latter impact is what would be expected if Daubert
was, at least partially, responsible for these changes.
Second, somewhat paradoxically, these studies suggest that the
reliability factors provided in the decision are not well understood by
many judges and, most importantly, are not frequently used to distinguish between admissible and inadmissible evidence. The relationship
between these factors and the decision's effect of heightening the bar
for admissibility is murky at best.
207. Id. at 99.
208. Id. at 109-10. Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge PamelaJensen's Note, which
concludes that the Frye and Daubert standards do not consistently lead to different outcomes in state courts for at least three types of evidence used in criminal cases. PamelaJ.
Jensen, Note, Frye versus Daubert: Practically the Same?, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1579 (2003).
209. RAND Study, supra note 3; FJC Study, supra note 3.
210. RAND Study, supra note 3, at 55.
211. Id. at 63.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

According to the 1998 FJC survey, in cases where evidence was
excluded, judges only pointed to problems with general acceptance,
peer review, and insufficient theory testing less than 8% of the time,
and dealt with falsifiability and error rates in less that 2% of cases
(even though 18% of their exclusions were based on reliability considerations).212 The FJC authors also report that the reasons for excluding testimony appear not to have changed significantly in the wake of
Daubert.2 13 Gatowski found that state judges, at least, do not have a
clear understanding of at least two of the factors: falsifiability and error rates.2 1 4 In the criminal context, the Daubert reliability criteria do
not predict admissibility findings (with the exception of general acceptance, discussed below)215

This picture is somewhat complicated by the RAND finding that
reliability generally and the reliability criteria specifically were discussed more frequently after the decision. 2 16 This trend turned
around four years later.2 1 7 After 1997, discussion of these factors decreased, with a corresponding increase in non-Daubertfactors. 2 18 The
second set of FJC surveys were distributed in 1998 and 1999 and hence
may reflect this downturn. Even at their peak, each of these reliability
criteria was discussed in the assessment of individual elements of evidence less than 40% of the time.2 1 9 Additionally, data from the Groscup Study suggests that, at least in the criminal context, even when
these criteria are addressed, they may not actually factor into the
0
judge's decisions. 22
One possible interpretation of the RAND data is that immediately
following the decision, judges attempted to stay as close to the text as
possible. As time went on, they grew emboldened to focus instead on
factors that they felt were more pertinent, useful, or effective. 22 1 The
RAND Study implies that parties likely responded to courts' heightened standards by submitting evidence that satisfied the reliability re212.

FJC Study, supra note 3, at 323.
213. Id. at 330.
214. Gatowski, supra note 203. The significance of this finding-that judges do not
grasp two of these factors-is called into question by Caudill & LaRue, supra note 82.
215. Groscup Study, supra note 3, at 353-56.
216. RAND Study, supra note 3, at 40.

217.

Id.

218.

Id. at xvi-xvii.

219.

Id. at 39.

220.
221.

Groscup Study, supra note 3, at 353-56.
RAND Study, supra note 3, at 40-41.
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quirement in some general sense, though not necessarily through the
2 22
use of these factors.
An alternative explanation is that judges applied the reliability
criteria initially and parties responded by presenting evidence that
complied with them. 2 23 Judges in subsequent years were then free to

focus on additional criteria, as the basic factors were generally satisfied in most cases. This explanation is possible, but it strikes one as
odd that courts would essentially stop discussing the reliability factors
simply because most evidence conformed to them. Moreover, given
state judges' apparent confusion over the meaning of at least two of
these factors, 224 it is more likely that courts increasingly abandoned
the factors, instead developing their own criteria for reliability. It
bears mentioning that even if this latter explanation is correct-even
if reliability factors have been addressed less frequently since 1997 because parties have started submitting evidence that meets these standards-the fact remains that judges in later years were not using the
reliability criteria to distinguish between admissible and inadmissible
data.
To summarize, the data suggests that Daubert had a rather
profound effect on the admissibility of evidence. The relationship between the reliability criteria and this effect, however, is unclear. What
seems to be missing is an explanation for how, mechanically, Daubert
has effectuated this change. At this junction, the Cheng & Yoon Study
provides critical insight.
B.

Analysis and Discussion of Cheng & Yoon Study Findings

This study strongly implies that what is important about Daubert is
not the doctrinal test included in the decision, but rather the awareness that the decision generated. Most of the changes effected by
Daubert appear to be the result of simply informing judges that they
should assume the role of gatekeeper. By focusing closely on the text
of the decision, prior critics have given too little attention to the bigger picture-Daubert's place in a cultural shift toward greater skepticism about scientific evidence.
By Cheng & Yoon's account, judges in jurisdictions that adopted
Daubert do not appear to be treating evidence differently from judges
in Fryejurisdictions, at least not in any manner that actually matters to
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 41.
Id. at 62.
Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 203, 1172-73.
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defendants. 225 What does this mean? For one thing, it reinforces the
idea that the reliability criteria currently play an insignificant role in
how judges distinguish between admissible and inadmissible evidence
since the criteria are not included in the Frye test. But its implications
are even broader, for this study suggests that the actual text of Daubert
is far less important than the decision's cultural and educative impacts. To the extent the decision had a real effect on admissibility, it
did so primarily by informing judges that they should function as gatekeepers to ensure that bad science does not make its way into the
courtroom. If Cheng & Yoon are correct, it would seem thatjudges in
all jurisdictions have adopted this role and that the Daubert decision is
largely irrelevant in explaining what is happening in the courtroom.
The methodology of this study is novel and subject to serious criticism. Nonetheless, this interpretation of Daubert's impacts is consistent with the paradoxical fact that the decision, which in some sense
was meant to "liberalize" the evidence rules, in fact tightened them. As
discussed above, the Court decided Daubert at a time when the problem ofjunk science was widely debated. Daubert'simpacts would seem
more consonant with a cultural phenomenon of heightened skepticism toward science, than with the decision's liberal thrust and literal
message that scientific theories need not be generally accepted to be
admissible. Moreover, this interpretation is consistent with the fact
that judges tend to rely on non-Daubert factors in rendering determi226
nations as to admissibility.
225. Cheng & Yoon Study, supra note 4, at 503.
226. This data also tends to favor the interpretation that the surprisingly small amount
of judicial attention to the reliability factors in recent years is not explained by the theory
that evidence generally satisfies these factors. Presumably, ifjudges in Daubertjurisdictions
are still looking at these criteria, we would probably expect to see some differences in
removal rates in those jurisdictions that have stuck to the Frye standard versus those that
have adopted Daubert because attorneys who believe that proffered evidence does not satisfy these criteria would be more likely to request removal.
This discussion contains one major caveat: while many of the criticisms discussed specifically addresses toxic tort cases, the studies above that reviewed civil cases included any
cases containing expert testimony or challenges to expert testimony, with the exception of

the Cheng & Yoon Study, which focused on torts generally. Toxic tort cases are a unique
subset of these, and it is not possible to say whether the generalizations made here necessarily apply in full to this subset. The Groscup Study, while focusing on criminal cases, did
find lengthier discussions of error rate and general acceptance for cases involving scientific
experts than for those involving other types of experts. Groscup Study, supra note 3, at 369.
Thus, it is possible that the reliability factors are being applied at a far greater rate in the
context of scientific evidence, and possibly even more so in the toxic tort setting. Then
again, increased discussion of factors does not necessarily imply that the influence of these
factors has increased. Future research focused specifically on scientific evidence and toxic
tort cases would be particularly informative.
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None of these studies was designed to directly address the question of whetherjudges are excluding too much evidence or the wrong
evidence, or whether the bar for admissibility has been set too high, or
too low for that matter (specifically in civil cases).227 One possible exception to this is Risinger's observation that criminal defendants almost always lose their admissibility challenges while civil defendants
usually prevail. 228 The disparities noted by Risinger are rather striking
and suggest that something different is at work in the criminal context. Judges may exhibit a bias in favor of evidence proposed by prosecutors. It is also possible, however, that prosecutors submit better,
more reliable evidence than civil plaintiffs or that court appointed defense counsel, with heavy caseloads and fewer resources than civil defense attorneys, launch less persuasive challenges to admissibility.
More research is needed to determine which of these factors are responsible for Risinger's findings. 229 Considering that this evidence
only includes relative admissibility rates, it is impossible to determine
whether the standard for admissibility in civil cases is too strict, the
standard for admissibility in criminal cases is too lax, or both.
C.

Do Current Criticisms of Daubert Miss the Real Issue?

Most scholars who have contributed to the academic dialogue
over the merits of the Daubertdecision have done so without the benefit of this recently accrued empirical data. The observations discussed
in the preceding section shed considerable light on the ways in which
Daubert may or may not have fallen short of expectations about what
230
such an admissibility standard should provide.
227. Identifying the mechanism by which Daubert has caused an increase in excluded
evidence does not necessarily equate to finding the mechanisms by which the application
of Daubertmay exclude evidence that otherwise should be admitted. However, by discovering what factors contribute most to a judge's admissibility finding in general, we get one
step closer to identifying which factors may be related to poor admissibility determinations.
228. Risinger, supra note 178, at 99.
229. It bears mentioning, however, that courts' frequent willingness to admit somewhat
dubious evidence, including handwriting and hair samples, suggests that a difference in
the quality of evidence submitted by civil plaintiffs versus prosecutors is probably an incomplete explanation. Id. at 105-12.
230. Unfortunately, many of the criticisms addressed in Part II either do not lend
themselves to empirical testing or were not addressed by this data. The second half of this
section makes suggestions for future research to explore those criticisms that can be tested.
Although many of the criticisms concerning Daubert addressed in Part II could not be
tested empirically, some are at least consistent with these findings. For example, while it is
obviously impossible to empirically test whether Daubert violates the spirit of the Seventh
Amendment, the evidence above at least supports the notion that juries are hearing a
considerably smaller proportion of proffered evidence. Furthermore, while I have not
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First, the empirical observations above suggest that the reliability
criteria probably are not particularly important in how judges make
admissibility determinations. On the one hand, this would seem to
render futile inquiries into whether or not Daubert incorporated a
flawed concept of good science by choosing poor indicators of reliability (for example, over-reliance on statistical significance or peer review) and whether or not judges are misapplying the criteria listed in
the decision (except insofar as they fail to apply them!). While it is not
possible to test whether the decision embraces a faulty philosophy of
science, we could conclude that even if it does, this fault probably has
little impact on admissibility decisions. As the Cheng & Yoon Study
implies, perhaps we are wasting time debating the merits of the doctrinal test in Daubert.
This response, however, may be incomplete because it begs the
question of why judges do not find the Daubert factors useful. 23 ' We
have seen at least two possible answers to this question. The reliability
factors simply may not be applicable to much of the evidence that
comes before judges. In other words, perhaps Daubertreflects an idealized version of science that is largely unhelpful given the realities of
scientific evidence. 23 2 Or the explanation may be even simpler: perhaps judges do not have a sufficient understanding of what these factors mean or how to apply them. Certainly the Gatowski study
supports this conclusion, at least among state court judges. 233 Either
way, the data would seem to imply that Daubert has failed to provide a
framework that judges, at least in recent years, find useful in distin-

thoroughly summarized the extensive evidence concerning the relative proficiencies of
judges and juries in analyzing expert testimony, this data does raise concerns that paternalistic justifications for the gatekeeping role may be misguided. See, e.g., Sanders, Legal Perceptions, supra note 9. Other criticisms that do not readily lend themselves to empirical testing
are whether plaintiffs have suffered a psychological loss from being denied the opportunity
to air their cases before a jury, whether defendants have been inadequately deterred because less information has been brought to the public's attention, the criticism thatjudgemade law under Daubert violates the principles of Erie, the criticisms that Daubert should
have incorporated a probabilistic notion of causation for reasons of improving justice for
plaintiffs, and finally, the argument that this decision exacerbated the cultural conflict
between science and the law.
231. As discussed above, though it may be the case that the reliability factors have
helped improve the quality of evidence presented, the reliability factors do not appear to
be particularly useful in recent years for helping judges distinguish between good and bad
evidence.
232. See generally Caudill & LaRue, supra note 82.
233. See Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 203, at 1172-73 (discussing Gatowski, supra
note 203).
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guishing between good and bad science, or admissible and inadmissible evidence.

234

These findings also illuminate concerns that judges may not be
competent to perform the task of distinguishing between good and
bad science. 23 5 Because the data above does not provide a complete
picture of how, exactly, judges make admissibility determinations, it is
impossible to reach any definitive response to this concern. But the
fact that judges are not making any great use of the reliability factors
in rendering decisions helps inform our concerns about their competency. By straying from the reliability factors, judges may be applying
inappropriate criteria and rendering inconsistent judgments. 2 36 For
example, scholars have taken issue with some judges' interpretation of
Daubert as requiring epidemiological data or specifically epidemiologi23 7
cal data that demonstrates a doubling of risk.
On the flip side, judges may be exploiting the elasticity of the
decision in a positive way. They may be correcting for Daubert'sfailure
to account for variation in the type of data produced by different scientific fields. In other words, judges may be adjusting to the realities
of what scientific evidence looks like in the world. Some scholars appear to be encouraged by a judicial willingness to adopt a pragmatic
approach towards scientific evidence. 23 8 As indicated above, the
RAND Study found that judges, once familiar with their role as gatekeepers, developed their own factors for determining the admissibility
of evidence. 239 Perhaps those scholars who take issue with the inclusion of peer review or statistical significance in the Daubert test should
be encouraged by judges' flexibility in analyzing evidence. At the very
least, these findings seem to appease fears that judges are simply applying the reliability criteria in a formulaic and unthinking manner.
234. It is important to remember that the DaubertCourt explicitly disclaimed providing
some sort of checklist for reliability. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593
(1993). Nonetheless, these factors were intended to provide judges with some guidance
and it would appear that such guidance has been largely abandoned. See id.
235. For a discussion on what sort of epistemological inquiries judges are competent to
undertake, see Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of
Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 803, 805, 814-19
(1997). This criticism is related to arguments concerning the philosophy of science
adopted by the decision.
236. This hypothesis is supported by the observation that courts have come to inconsistent conclusions regarding the effects of the drug Parlodel. TELLUS PUBUICATION, supra
note 36, at 11-12.
237. JudicialBoundary Drawing, supra note 42, at 39-41.
238. See generally Caudill & LaRue, supra note 82. Judges may also be taking into account cultural and rhetorical elements of science. See id.
239. See generally RAND Study, supra note 3, at 40.
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Despite its failure to provide useful criteria forjudges, Daubertappears to have been successful in elevating judges to the position of
gatekeeper. Judges appear to be scrutinizing evidence more carefully
and admitting less of it. If Cheng & Yoon's hypothesis is correct,
Daubert and the debate surrounding the decision had this effect not
only in jurisdictions in which the Daubert standard has been adopted,
but even in jurisdictions that have not adopted it.
Indeed, the evidence would seem to suggest that the decision reflects, or perhaps has spawned, a cultural phenomenon in the law
whose primary characteristics are skepticism toward scientific evidence and a more active role for the judge in assessing evidence.
Once again, this development could explain how a decision that was
supposed to liberalize the admissibility of evidence by allowing in
methodologically sound minority opinions, 240 which had been previously excluded under Frye,24 1 has, in fact, had the opposite effect. After Daubert, a lack of general acceptance was a better predictor for a
finding of inadmissibility than before Daubet.24 2 This finding is not

only surprising but also ironic; at the same time that judges are taking
a significantly more active role in assessing the quality of evidence on
their own terms, they are demonstrating increased deference to the
majority view of the scientific community. Most importantly, this finding suggests that Daubertis being misapplied to some degree. A faithful application of the decision should not result in an increased role
for general acceptance.
Overall, there is much explanatory power in Cheng & Yoon's theory that the effects from Daubert have more to do with increasing
awareness about bad science and with a cultural shift towards greater
skepticism about scientific evidence than with the actual doctrine of
the case. As seen through this lens, the decision either accomplished a
tremendous amount or accomplished very little. While it helped revolutionize how judges across the country in all jurisdictions perceive
scientific evidence and their role in assessing it, it also provided a standard with little usable content. True, the decision undoubtedly did do
something important-something worth talking about. But these
studies also suggest that if we are going to turn a critical eye to the
Daubert decision, we should be faulting it not for what it did, but for
what it has failed to do. Or perhaps, we should refocus many of our
criticisms away from the decision itself and onto the development of a
240.
241.
242.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
See Sanders, Legal Perceptions, supra note 9, at 140.
Though this factor is still only mentioned in a small percentage of cases.
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culture in the law that treats science with a certain type of scrutiny and
skepticism. To the extent that we want to improve judicial practices
with regard to admissibility, we may want to either incorporate into
the standard those factors that judges actually find useful in assessing
evidence, or to focus more on "soft" solutions that "increase243the judiciary's understanding of scientific concepts and processes.'
D.

Suggestions for Future Research

The studies above raise serious questions as to what factors judges
are using to distinguish admissible from inadmissible evidence and
why the reliability factors enumerated in Daubert are not more regularly utilized. It would be particularly interesting to ascertain why
judges are applying the Daubert factors so infrequently and why these
factors seem not to correlate well with admissibility decisions (except
for general acceptance). By simply asking judges, via a survey instrument, what factors they are utilizing and why, we could significantly
improve our understanding of this phenomenon.
None of these studies provides sufficient information on what
other reliability-indicating factors judges are using, nor on whether
the decision should have contained other reliability factors. Although
the RAND Study coded for many factors that entered into reliability
assessments, those factors that were included in the published findings were relatively uncontroversial. One potential line of future research would involve identifying a list of reliability factors (including
controversial ones) and then conducting a review of decisions similar
to the RAND Study (particularly focusing on toxic tort cases).
The criticisms that Daubertand Joinerencourage sequential review
of evidence for admissibility and may confuse admissibility and sufficiency standards244 are consistent with the general finding that less
evidence is being admitted.2 45 Nevertheless, the studies conducted so
far have not captured data that indicates whether judges are, indeed,
evaluating evidence in this manner. In the future, researchers may
want to ask several questions when looking at admissibility decisions,
and perhaps also at the transcripts of Daubert hearings: Does it appear
that judges are considering the relevance and reliability of evidence
243. Cheng & Yoon Study, supra note 4, at 504. Curiously, judges may not even be fully
aware of the impact Daubert has had on their practices, as indicated by the FJC Study finding that a majority of judges failed to report actual changes in their management of cases
after Daubert. FJC Study, supra note 3, at 329.
244. Intellectual Due Process, supra note 38, 1075-76; Capra, supra note 45, at 754-55.
245. See generally, RAND Study, supra note 3.
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sequentially or are they evaluating it holistically? Do judges appear to
be making sufficiency judgments when they should be focusing on
reliability or are they keeping these two inquiries distinct? Finally, do
differences in these procedures result in different outcomes?
Another fertile topic for future inquiry is whether Daubert has reduced the frequency with which defendants produce evidence. As
mentioned earlier, this criticism is particularly relevant in the toxic
tort context, where encouraging defendants to produce scientific evidence may help improve our position of relative ignorance about
chemical exposure. At first glance, the FJC Study would seem to refute
this finding. Its authors observed that the percentage of trials containing experts testifying for plaintiffs and the percentage containing experts testifying for defendants remained relatively consistent from
1991 to 1998.246 However, this data includes only cases that went to
trial. 247 The rationale behind the idea that defendants would produce
less evidence is that early in the case they may be able to defeat the
plaintiff by criticizing her evidence, winning a motion for exclusion,
and prevailing in a summary judgment motion all without having to
proffer any evidence. Once a case is destined for trial, the defendant
would be far more likely to present her best evidence. Research directed at answering this question could address the question of
whether, for all cases that at least reach summary judgment, defendants are providing less scientific evidence than they used to.
Finally, as suggested by the authors of the RAND Study, research
could be conducted to compare judges' actual decisions on admissibility with independent experts' assessments. This could produce very
interesting and valuable results. However, were such a study to be carried out, it would be important to remember that not all scholars
agree with the notion that the best scientific judgment of good evidence necessarily equates to the best legal judgment of good
evidence.
Conclusion
This Article has provided an overview of criticisms of the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert and a summary of recent empirical
data showing how Daubert is being applied by judges and how parties
to litigations have responded to it. Reviewing this data, the Article
concludes that Daubert has raised the bar for admissibility, and, at least
246.
247.

FJC Study, supra note 3, at 318-19.
Id. at 318.
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in recent years, that the reliability factors enumerated in the decision
are not widely used and probably are not the mechanism by which
Daubert has affected admissibility.
Criticisms of Daubert should focus more on the decision's failure
to establish a useful list of criteria that, in practice, assists judges in
making admissibility determinations. This Article adopts Cheng &
Yoon's hypothesis that Daubert's most important contribution to the
development of evidentiary standards has more to do with Daubert's
educative function than with its doctrinal text. The decision has created or contributed to a large cultural shift while failing to provide
useful content that would ensure that this transformation is effectuated in a consistent fashion. This cultural shift is likely responsible for
increasing, rather than decreasing, the relative importance of general
acceptance as a factor in making admissibility determinations. This
result is inconsistent with the thrust of Daubert.
Finally, this Article has made recommendations for future research to help answer the many intriguing questions left open by prior
studies. Chief among these is research aimed at determining what criteria judges are actually using to distinguish between admissible and
inadmissible evidence. This is the key question to which scholars must
now turn a critical eye.
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